BMC West Corporation v. Desert Crest Development and Jessica Barker: Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
BMC West Corporation v. Desert Crest
Development and Jessica Barker: Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
F. Mark Hansen; Counsel for Appellee.
Gary H. Weight; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight and Esplin; Counsel for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, BMC West Corporation v. Desert Crest Development, No. 20010269 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3217
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BMC WEST CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DESERT CREST DEVELOPMENT, INC.; 
JESSICA BARKER; and DOES 1-20, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 20010269-SC 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT, 
TO DECLARE ADMITTED REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, 
FOR RULE 37 SANCTIONS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Gary H. Weight, Utah Bar #3415 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P. O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801)373-4912 
Attorneys for Defendants 
F. Mark Hansen, Utah Bar #5078 
F. Mark Hansen, P.C. 
431 North 1300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Telephone: (801)517-3530 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Utah Court of Appeals 
AUG 0 3 200! 
Pautetle Stagg 
Clark of the- Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BMC WEST CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DESERT CREST DEVELOPMENT, INC.; 
JESSICA BARKER; and DOES 1-20, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 20010269-SC 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT, 
TO DECLARE ADMITTED REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, 
FOR RULE 37 SANCTIONS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Gary H. Weight, Utah Bar #3415 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P. O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801)373-4912 
F. Mark Hansen, Utah Bar #5078 
F. Mark Hansen, P.C. 
431 North 1300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Telephone: (801) 517-3530 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 15 
ARGUMENT 17 
I. DEFENDANTS DO NOT APPEAL THE ORDER UPHOLDING 
ADMISSIONS OR GRANTING RULE 37 SANCTIONS 17 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY STRUCK THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
DESERT CREST 20 
A. Defendants Did Not Preserve The Issue For Appeal, And Have Not 
Adequately Briefed The Issue 20 
B. The Trial Court Properly Struck The Affidavit of Desert Crest as Not 
Based on The Affiant's Personal Knowledge 23 
C. Defendants' Acts Are Sanctionable Under Rule 37 24 
D. The Trial Court's Choice of Sanctions Was Within Its Discretion. 
26 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
28 
A. Defendants Did Not Preserve The Issue For Appeal, And Have Not 
Adequately Briefed The Issue 28 
B. Summary Judgment Was Proper Where There Was No Dispute of 
Material Fact 29 
B. Summary Judgment Was Proper Where Defendants Requested No 
Relief under Rule 56(f) 30 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Coleman ex rel. Schefski vs. Stevens. 2000 UT 98, 17 P.3d 1122 21, 22 
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994) 24 
Hales v. Oldrovd. 2000 UT App 75, 999 P.2d 588 28 
Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281 20, 21 
Lefavi v. Bertoch. 2000 UT App 5, 999 P.2d 817 19 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997) 1, 24-28 
Sittner v. Schriever. 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442 1, 20 
Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App 370, 995 P.2d 14 21 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j) 1 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 37 3, 26 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56 4 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c) 23 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(f) 3, 30 
Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501 30 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1 1 
ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE ONE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY STRIKING THE DECEMBER 13,1999 AFFIDAVIT 
OF DESERT CREST AS A DISCOVERY SANCTION. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. See Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 
938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (emphasis in original; citations omitted): 
Before a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under rule 37, the court 
must find on the part of the noncomplying party, willfulness, bad faith, or 
fault, or "persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." . . . 
"Because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery 
process, they are given broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery 
sanctions." Thus we have long held that we will not interfere unless "abuse 
of that discretion [is] clearly shown." . . . Wa will find that a trial court 
has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if there 
is either "an erroneous conclusion of law or ... no evidentiary basis for the 
trial court's ruling." 
Preservation of Issue: Desert Crest and Barker did not preserve this issue for appeal. 
Failure to raise an argument before the trial court precludes a party from raising that 
argument on appeal. Sittner v. Schriever. 2000 UT 45, ^16, 2 P.3d 442, 444. Desert 
Crest and Barker argue the trial court abused its discretion by invoking Rule 37 as grounds 
for striking the December 13, 1999 Affidavit of Desert Crest Development. However, 
Defendants did not raise that argument before the trial court. Desert Crest and Barker 
argued only that the Affidavit should not be stricken because it was based on the 
corporation's personal knowledge. [R187-188] The trial court found from a review of 
Barker's deposition that the Affidavit was in fact not based on her personal knowledge, and 
ordered it stricken in part for that reason. [R315, incorporating by reference R229, 231, 
292-295] Defendants have not appealed that part of the Order. 
BMC West has fully briefed this issue to preserve its own right to argue the issue on 
appeal. If this court agrees that Desert Crest and Barker did not preserve this issue for 
appeal, BMC West respectfully asks this court to affirm the trial court for that reason. 
ISSUE TWO: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN BMC WEST'S FAVOR. 
Standard of Review: Desert Crest and Barker correctly stated the standard of review. 
Preservation of Issue: Desert Crest and Barker did not preserve this issue for appeal. 
Desert Crest and Barker argue on appeal that the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment because their Answers to Interrogatories created issues of fact. 
However, the trial court, pursuant to BMC West's motion [R227, R232, 299], struck 
Defendants' evidence, including interrogatory responses,, so far as it contradicted BMC 
West's evidence: "Pursuant to Rule 37, the Court orders defendants are not allowed to 
introduce matters in evidence in opposition to the November 30, 1999 Affidavit of Charles 
Rhodes, and orders stricken any such matters currently in the record." [R315] Desert 
Crest and Barker did not argue to the trial court what effect striking their Interrogatory 
responses would have on the Motion for Summary Judgment [R284-290, record generally], 
and do not argue that issue on appeal. [Brief of Appellants generally] 
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Desert Crest and Barker also argue that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment because discovery is not complete. Again, Desert Crest and Barker did not raise 
that argument below. That issue is governed by Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(f). Desert Crest 
and Barker did not move the trial court for a Rule 56(f) continuance, or raise the issue 
before the trial court in any way whatsoever. [R168-174, 284-290, record generally] 
BMC West has folly briefed this issue to preserve its own right to argue the issue on 
appeal. If this court agrees that Desert Crest and Barker did not preserve this issue for 
appeal, BMC West respectfully asks this court to affirm the trial court for that reason. 
ISSUE THREE: WHETHER BMC WEST IS ENTITLED TO ITS 
ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST DEFENDANTS ON APPEAL. 
Standard of Review: Not applicable. 
Preservation of Issue: The trial court found BMC West is entitled to attorney fees 
pursuant to contract, including attorney fees in collecting the judgment. [R46, 48, 144-
145, 315-316] Defendants do not challenge that part of the Order. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
UtahR. Civ. Proc. 37: 
(b)(2) If a party or . . . managing agent of a party . . . fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery, . . . the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the 
following: . . . 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated 
matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings 
until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, 
or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; . . . 
(d) If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party . . . fails (1) 
to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a 
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted 
under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service 
of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action 
authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. 
UtahR. Civ. Proc. 56: 
(a) A party seeking to recover upon a claim . . . may . . . move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. . . . 
(c) The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance 
with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . . 
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. . . . When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 22, 1999 BMC West filed a Complaint against Desert Crest for'breach of 
contract, for failing to pay for conforming goods sold on open account. BMC West also 
sued Barker on her personal guaranty for Desert Crest's debt. On June 15, 2001 BMC 
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West served written discovery. When Defendants failed to respond, BMC West moved the 
trial court for an order compelling discovery and for sanctions, which the trial court 
granted. The trial court ordered that Defendants were estopped "from offering any 
evidence requested in the discovery and not produced in Defendants' responses." 
Defendants then belatedly served their discovery responses. BMC West relied on the 
completeness of the discovery responses to move for summary judgment. Defendants 
opposed the motion with an affidavit alleging facts not disclosed in their discovery 
responses, in violation of the discovery order. The trial court denied summary judgment, 
but reserved the issue of further discovery sanctions. 
BMC West served a second set of discovery, including requests for admissions. 
When Desert Crest and Barker failed to timely respond, the requests were admitted. BMC 
West then noticed the deposition of Barker, who tfiree times canceled and rescheduled her 
deposition. When Barker finally testified, she admitted an affidavit she signed to oppose 
summary judgment was not based on her personal knowledge, and that she was completely 
ignorant of the facts set forth in her affidavit. She also admitted that Ben Magelsen, whom 
she had held out as just a friend, was her husband, the managing agent of Desert Crest, and 
the sole agent of Desert Crest with knowledge of the facts. 
BMC West then noticed Magelsen's deposition. Magelsen also repeatedly canceled 
and rescheduled his deposition. When Magelsen failed to offer a new deposition date after 
his last unilateral cancellation, BMC West moved the trial court for an order to strike 
Desert Crest's Affidavit, exclude certain matters from evidence, declare the requests for 
admission were admitted, and grant summary judgment in BMC West's favor. Only then 
did Defendants finally serve their responses to BMC West's second set of discovery. The 
trial court granted BMC West's motion. Desert Crest and Barker then appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 22, 1999 BMC West filed its Complaint in this action. [Rl] 
2. On June 15, 1999 BMC West served Desert Crest and Barker with its First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. [R28-37] 
3. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. 33, 34, and 6, Defendants' responses were 
due July 19, 1999. Desert Crest and Barker ignored the discovery requests. On August 
20, 1999 BMC served a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. [R26-27] 
4. Desert Crest and Barker did not oppose BMC West's Motion to Compel and 
for Sanctions, [record generally] On October 7, 1999 the Court entered its Order 
granting BMC West's Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, which compelled Desert Crest 
and Barker to answer the discovery, and included the following sanction: 
The Court orders that Defendants are estopped from denying the 
completeness of their responses, and from offering any evidence requested in 
the discovery and not produced in Defendants' responses. . . . The Court 
orders that any failure of Defendants to comply to the letter with this order 
will result in Defendants' pleadings bing stricken and judgment by default 
entered against Defendants. [R41] 
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5. Desert Crest and Barker do not appeal the trial court's October 7,1999 Order 
Granting Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. [Docketing Statement and Brief of 
Appellants generally] 
6. On October 15,1999 nearly three month late, Desert Crest and Barker finally 
served their responses to BMC West's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents. [R154-166] 
7. In reliance on Desert Crest and Barker' discovery responses and the language 
of the Order Granting BMC's Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, ordering "Defendants 
are estopped from denying the completeness of their responses, and from offering any 
evidence requested in the discovery and not produced in Defendants' responses," on 
November 30, 1999 BMC served a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting 
Memorandum and Affidavit. [R143, 144-147, 148-166] 
8. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, BMC West submitted the following 
facts as undisputed: [R144-145] 
1. In February of 1998 BMC entered into a contract with Desert 
Crest Development or the sale of building materials. The contract is 
evidenced by a "Confidential Credit Application and Terms Agreement." 
The contract provides in part: 
OUT-OF-YARD PURCHASES: Accounts are due and payable net on 
or before the 10th of the month following date of purchase or as stated 
on the invoice. ... 
DIRECT SHIPMENT PURCHASES: Direct shipments are due 10 
days after net of invoice, net 11 days, unless otherwise quoted. ... 
PAST DUE ACCOUNTS: ... A late charge of 2 % per month (24 % 
A.P.R.) will be assessed on all past due balances. The customer 
agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and otiier costs of collection. 
[Rhodes Afft 1 1 , Ex. 1] 
2. As part of the consideration for the contract between BMC and 
Desert Crest, Jessica Barker executed a Guaranty, which provides in part: 
... the undersigned [hereinafter called "Guarantor(s)") [Barker] do 
hereby jointly and severally, unconditionally promise and guarantee 
the payment of any sum or balance that may now exist or hereafter be 
contracted on account of said debtor [Desert Crest] with BMC West 
Corporation ... 
Each Guarantor hereunder agrees to pay to BMC West Corporation all 
costs of collection, including attorneys fees, which may be incurred in 
the collection or enforcement of this Guaranty ... 
[Rhodes Afft 1 2, Ex. 2] 
3. Barker's Guaranty also states, "BMC West Corporation shall 
have a lien against the property now or hereafter in the possession of each 
Guarantor [Barker] for all amounts due and not paid hereunder which lien 
may be exercised without demand or notice." [Rhodes Afft Ex. 2] 
4. In February through June 1998, BMC delivered and Desert 
Crest accepted delivery of conforming goods ordered by Desert Crest 
pursuant to the contract, for which Desert Crest failed to pay. [Rhodes Afft 
13, Ex. 3] 
5. The principal balance due on Desert Crest's account, after 
adjusting for ail payments and credits, is at least $15,312.77. [Rhodes Afft 
14] 
9. Based on those facts, BMC West argued that under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-709(l), and the terms of the parties' contract, BMC West 
was entitled to judgment against Desert Crest and Barker. [R145-146] 
10. On December 13, 1999 Desert Crest and Barker served their Memorandum 
in Opposition to Summary Judgment, supported by an Affidavit of Desert Crest 
Development signed by Jessica Barker, president, and a separate Affidavit of Jessica 
Barker. [R168-174, 175-178, 179-180] 
11. Desert Crest's and Barker's Statement of Disputed Facts cited their Answers 
to Interrogatories and an Affidavit of Ben Magelsen as supporting evidence. However, 
Desert Crest and Barker did not file either Answers to Interrogatories or an Affidavit of 
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Ben Magelsen in opposition to BMC West's Motion for Summary Judgment. There is not 
and never was an "Affidavit of Ben Magelsen." [R168-180; record generally] 
12. On December 28, 1999 BMC served its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. BMC West analyzed how Desert Crest's and Barker's 
Memorandum in Opposition relied on evidence requested in the discovery and not produced 
in Crest's and Barker's Answers to Interrogatories, in violation of the Order Granting 
Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. [R148-152] 
13. On February 4, 2000 the Court issued a Minute Entry stating: 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment has come before this Court 
pursuant to Rule 4-501. The Motion is DENIED. According to defendant's 
Memorandum there are disputed issues of material fact. However, the Court 
reserves the question of further sanctions for plaintiffs [sic - should be 
Defendants'] violation of the Court's Order granting Defendant's [sic -
should be BMC West's] "Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions." 
[R183-184] The Minute Entry was not entered as a formal Order. [Record generally] 
14. On February 10, 2000 BMC served its Second Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents. [R207-212] 
15. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. 33, 34, 36 and 6, Desert Crest's and 
Barker's responses were due March 14, 2000. Desert Crest and Barker did not timely 
respond to those discovery requests [R205-206], and in fact did not serve their responses 
until December 15, 2000, some nine months late. [R291] 
16. On February 18, 2000 BMC West filed a Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions, 
describing how Defendants' responses to BMC West's first set of discovery violated the 
trial court's October 7, 1999 Order Granting Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, and 
moving the trial court to enforce the Order, strike Desert Crest's and Barker's pleading, 
and enter judgment by default against Desert Crest and Barker. [R186-190] 
17. On March 3, 2000 Desert Crest and Barker filed their Response to BMC 
West's Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions. [R191-195] 
18. On March 21, 2000 BMC West filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions. [R204-212] BMC West pointed out that even though 
Desert Crest and Barker claimed not to have seen the October 7, 1999 Order Granting 
Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions until January 3, 2000, over two months 
later Defendants still had not fully complied with that Order. [R205] 
19. BMC West also pointed out that Desert Crest's and Barker's responses to 
BMC West's Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for 
Production of Documents were past due, and that the Requests for Admissions had 
therefore already been admitted. [R205] 
20. The trial court ruled entry of judgment by default against Desert Crest and 
Barker, was not warranted at that time. On May 11, 2000 the trial court issued a Minute 
Entry on BMC West's Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions, stating, "Dismissal [sic - should read 
"judgment by default"] is DENIED." [R216] The Minute Entry was not reduced to an 
Order, [record generally] 
21. OnJunel9,2000BMCnoticedBarker'sdepositionforJulyl2,2000. [R229] 
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22. Just before that date, counsel for Defendants informed counsel for BMC West 
that Barker would not appear for her deposition as scheduled. At Defendants' request, 
BMC West agreed to continue Barker's deposition to July 19, 2000. [R229] 
23. On July 18, 2000 counsel for Defendants informed counsel that BMC West 
that Barker would not appear for her deposition as rescheduled for July 19, 2000, and 
obtained yet another delay, to July 26, 2000. [R229] 
24. On July 26, 2000, an hour before the deposition was to begin, counsel for 
Defendants for the third time informed BMC West that Barker would not appear for her 
deposition as scheduled, and at Defendants' request had Barker's deposition rescheduled 
yet again, for August 29, 2000. [R229] 
25: On August 29, 2000 Jessica Barker appeared for her deposition. [R229] 
26. In her deposition, Barker for the first time admitted she had no personal 
knowledge of the facts she had testified to in her December 13, 1999 Affidavit of Desert 
Crest Development. [R229, 240-280, 293-295] Barker also revealed that Ben Magelsen, 
previously identified as only "a friend,M was in fact her husband, that Magelsen was Desert 
Crest's managing agent, and that Magelsen was the only agent of Desert Crest with 
knowledge of the facts regarding BMC West's claims against Desert Crest. [R229, 241-
246, 251-257, 259-267, 270-271, 275, 278, 280] 
27. Magelsen was present at Barker's deposition. Therefore, at the close of the 
deposition, on August 29, 2000 Magelsen and counsel for all parties stipulated to 
September 20, 2000 as a firm date for Mr. Magelsen's deposition. [R229] 
28. On September 19, 2000 counsel for Defendants informed counsel for BMC 
West that Magelsen would not appear the next day for his deposition, but that he would 
contact Magelsen and get back immediately with another firm deposition date. [R230] 
29. Counsel for BMC West did not hear from counsel for Desert Crest and Barker 
again until October 4, 2000, when counsel for Defendants wrote stating "My client, Ben 
Magelsen, has advised me that he will be available for depositions any time after October 
9, 2000." Counsel for BMC West then coordinated with counsel for Desert Crest and 
Barker for a new firm deposition date for Magelsen, of November 6, 2000. [R230] 
30. The morning of November 6, 2000, as counsel for BMC West was 
completing preparation for Ben Magelsen's deposition, counsel for Defendants called to say 
Magelsen once again would not appear for his deposition. Counsel represented he would 
be in contact with Magelsen later that day, and would immediately give BMC West another 
firm date for Magelsen's deposition. [R230] 
31. By November 22, 2000, counsel for BMC West still had not heard from 
counsel for Desert Crest and Barker as to when if ever Magelsen would make himself 
available for his deposition. [R230] 
32. On November 28, 2000 BMC West filed its Motion to Strike Affidavit, to 
Declare Admitted Requests for Admissions, for Rule 37 Sanctions and for Summary 
Judgment [R227], in which BMC West moved the trial court as follows: 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. 36, 37, 54 and 56, BMC West 
Corporation moves the Court to: strike the December 13, 1999 Affidavit of 
Desert Crest Development as not made on personal knowledge; declare 
Requests for Admissions 3 and 4 admitted; bar Defendants from introducing 
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matters in evidence in opposition to the November 30, 1999 Affidavit of 
Charles Rhodes; reconsider the Court's February 4, 2000 Minute Entry 
denying BMC's Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter summary 
judgment in favor of BMC and against Defendants. 
33. In its supporting Memorandum BMC West proffered facts regarding Desert 
Crest's and Barker's failures to cooperate in written discovery and depositions. [R228-230] 
BMC West argued Defendants' conduct "clearly demonstrated a disregard for the rules of 
court, and an intent to delay, hinder and obstruct BMC from obtaining . . . the additional 
evidence BMC requires . . . " [R232] 
34. On December 18, 2000 Desert Crest and Barker filed their response to BMC 
West's Motion. [R284-290] Desert Crest and Barker did not contest any of the facts BMC 
West proffered in support of its Motion regarding Desert Crest's and Barker's persistent 
dilatory discovery tactics. [R284-286] 
35. Desert Crest and Barker admitted that in opposing BMC West's Motion' for 
Summary Judgment, they had relied on evidence requested in BMC West's discovery 
requests and not produced in their responses, in violation of the trial court's October 7, 
1999 Order granting Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. [R284-285, 11-5] They 
admitted the trial court had "reserved for further ruling sanctions for the Defendant's 
violation of the Court's Order Granting the Motion to Compel Discovery" [R285, 16], and 
did not challenge that ruling. They admitted "there is no record of the[ir] responses to the 
second discovery requests of the Plaintiff having been sent to Plaintiffs Counsel," R285-
286 [^8], and they were "seriously delinquent in the filing of their responses [to BMC 
West's second set of written discovery requests]." [R288-289] They admitted Magelsen 
had repeatedly refused to attend his previously scheduled (and rescheduled) deposition, only 
in order to accommodate "his busy travel schedule." [R289] 
36. Desert Crest and Barker also falsely stated, "At no time between the 16h of 
February, 2000 and the date Plaintiff filed its present motion, did the Defendant's [sic] 
receive any notice, either by way of motion to compel, informal reminder or otherwise that 
they had not responded to the discovery requests." [R288] That statement was belied by 
BMC West's March 21, 2001 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Rule 37 
Sanctions, wherein BMC West gave Desert Crest and Barker notice: [R205] 
Defendants' discovery abuses are compounded by their latest failure 
to respond to discovery. On February 10, 2000 BMC West served 
Defendants with its Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions 
and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached. Defendants's responses were due March 14, 2000 
and are not forthcoming. (Among other things, this means the four Requests 
for Admissions stand admitted.) 
37. On December 28,2000 BMC West filed its Reply Memorandum. [R292-299] 
BMC West compared the December 13, 1999 Affidavit of Desert Crest Corporation, 
signed by Jessica Barker, with Barker's deposition testimony, showing that Barker did not 
have personal knowledge of the facts stated in her affidavit, and was not competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. [R292-295] 
38. BMC West argued Defendants' persistent dilatory tactics justified the trial 
court in imposing an appropriate Rule 37 sanction, and asked only for relief the trial court 
had power to grant on other grounds: "an Order (1) striking Desert Crest's December 13, 
14 
1999 Affidavit; (2) letting Defendants' admissions stand; and (3) enforcing the Order 
Granting Motion to Compel and for Sanctions already entered by the Court." [R297] 
39. BMC West then pointed out that, with the requested Rule 37 relief, there 
would be no dispute of material fact, and that BMC West would be entitled to summary 
judgment. [R297-298] 
40. On February 7, 2001 the trial court entered the Order from which Desert 
Crest and Barker appeal. [R315-317] 
41. Desert Crest and Barker appeal only those portions of the Order striking the 
Affidavit of Desert Crest on Rule 37 grounds, and granting summary judgment in BMC 
West's favor. Desert Crest and Barker did not appeal the remainder of the Order. 
[Docketing Statement; Brief of Appellants] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In addition to striking the Affidavit of Desert Crest, the trial court declared 
Defendants' Requests for Admissions were admitted, and struck and excluded all other 
evidence in opposition to the Affidavit of Charles Rhodes, including any interrogatory 
responses of Defendants in the record. Defendants did not challenge that part of the Order, 
or the findings of fact or conclusions of law underlying the Order, or the proffers of 
evidence on which those findings and conclusions are based. Those matters are not at 
issue, and must be taken as conclusively established for purposes of appeal. 
Defendants contend the trial court improperly used Rule 37 to strike the Affidavit 
of Desert Crest. However, Defendants did not argue to the trial court that Rule 37 should 
not be used to strike the Affidavit, did not adequately brief the issue here, and so did not 
preserve the issue for appeal. The trial court struck the Affidavit for two independent 
reasons, one of which was that the Affidavit was not based on the affiant's personal 
knowledge, and therefore violated Rule 56(c). Defendants do not challenge that part of the 
trial court's ruling. 
Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion by enforcing its previous order 
compelling discovery, on the grounds the Affidavit did not violate that order. Defendants 
misread the trial court's decision. The trial court found that by failing to timely respond 
to two different sets of written discovery, by serving incomplete discovery responses in the 
face of an order compelling discovery, and by both of Defendants' principal witnesses 
repeatedly failing to appear for their depositions, Defendants had engaged in persistent 
dilatory tactics and willful discovery violations, which justified the imposition of Rule 37 
Sanctions, and that the exclusion of certain evidence was an appropriate sanction. 
Defendants fail to argue the actual grounds for the Order they appeal, and fail to marshal 
the evidence, and otherwise fail to show how the trial court clearly abused its discretion. 
Defendants argue this court should reverse the grant of summary judgment, on the 
grounds their interrogatory responses create issues of fact. Defendants fail to identify any 
particular fact put in issue by their interrogatory responses More importantly, Defendants 
overlook the fact that the trial court struck, not just the Affidavit of Desert Crest, but all 
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matters in the record in opposition to the Affidavit of Charles Rhodes, including any 
interrogatory responses. Since Defendants do not challenge on appeal the striking of their 
interrogatory responses, there remains no evidence in the record to create a fact issue as to 
the matters established by the Affidavit of Charles Rhodes. That Affidavit establishes 
undisputed facts justifying summary judgment in BMC West's favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS DO NOT APPEAL THE ORDER UPHOLDING 
ADMISSIONS OR GRANTING RULE 37 SANCTIONS, 
The trial court's February 7, 2001 Order incorporated BMC West's supporting 
memoranda as its Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [R315] The trial court found: 
Defendants have not challenged the fact that Desert Crest breached its 
contract by failing to pay BMC for materials purchased, but defend on the 
ostensible grounds that a few of the goods delivered were non-conforming, 
and that the person signing Jessica Barker's personal guarantee was not Ms. 
Barker. Defendants have thrown every available stumbling block in the path 
of BMC's attempt to discover the facts supporting Defendants' claims and 
bring this matter to judgment. Defendants failed and refused for four months 
to answer BMC's first set of discovery, and finally answered only after BMC 
obtained an Order Compelling Discovery and for Sanctions. The Court 
ordered, "Defendants are estopped from denying the completeness of their 
responses, and from offering any evidence requested in the discovery and not 
produced in Defendants' responses." When BMC relied on the that Order 
and the supposed completeness of BMC's responses in bringing a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Defendants violated the Order by offering evidence 
requested in the discovery and not produced in Defendants' responses . . . 
. . . BMC served its second discovery requests to obtain the details of Ms. 
Barker's personal guarantee. BMC served Requests for Admission ... 
Defendants did not reply to those requests for admissions. Under Rule 
36(a)(2) those matters are deemed admitted. It is therefore undisputed that 
whoever signed "Jessica Barker" to the personal guarantee had actual and 
apparent authority to do so. 
BMC also served these Interrogatories: [Nos. 13 and 14] . . . 
Defendants did not answer these Interrogatories. That failure is sanctionable 
under Rule 37(d)(2). 
BMC then tried to depose Ms. Barker. Defendants repeatedly delayed 
Ms. Barker's deposition, moving it from July 12, 2000 to July 19, then to 
July 26, and finally to August 29, 2000. When Ms, Barker finally gave her 
deposition, BMC discovered Ms. Barker's Affidavit of Desert Crest 
Development, offered to oppose BMC's Motion for Summary Judgment, was 
not based on personal knowledge, and offered in blatant violation of Rule 
56(e) . . . 
Ms. Barker's deposition also disclosed that Bien Magelsen, who up to 
that time Defendants had held out only as "a friend," was actually Ms. 
Barker's husband, was Desert Crest's managing agent, and was likely the 
only one on Defendants' side with knowledge of the facts. After Ms. 
Barker's deposition Mr. Magelsen and counsel stipulated to September 20, 
2000 for the taking of Mr. Magelsen's deposition. Defendants then 
unilaterally delayed Mr. Magelsen's deposition, first to October 9,2000, then 
to November 6. On that date Defendants stated they would immediately 
commit to another firm date for Mr. Magelsen's deposition, but BMC has not 
heard from them since. Defendants' repeated failures to produce Mr. 
Magelsen for his deposition is sanctionable under Rule 37(d)(1). 
Defendants have engaged in repeated delays and failures in responding 
to two sets of written discovery, repeated failures to appear for depositions, 
and in opposing summary judgment with an affidavit they knew was not made 
on personal knowledge in violation of Rule 56(e). Defendants have clearly 
demonstrated a disregard for the rules of court, and an intent to delay, hinder 
and obstruct BMC from obtaining either a judgment . . . or the additional 
evidence BMC requires . . . 
[R315, incorporating by reference R230-232] 
Defendants admit they refused for four months to answer BMC's first 
set of discovery, and answered only after BMC obtained an Order 
Compelling Discovery and for Sanctions. Their responses even then were 
incomplete and in violation of the Order. Defendants admit they then again 
violated the Order by opposing BMC's Motion for Summary Judgment with 
evidence requested in the discovery and not produced in Defendants' 
responses. 
Defendants admit they failed to answer BMC's second discovery 
requests until after receiving this Motion, over nine months late. 
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Defendants do not dispute they repeatedly delayed Ms. Barker's 
deposition, moving it from July 12, 2000 to July 19, then to July 26, and 
finally to August 29, 2000, and when Ms. Barker finally gave her deposition, 
her testimony established the Affidavit of Desert Crest Development she gave 
to oppose summary judgment was not even based on her personal knowledge. 
In a very real sense, Ben Magelsen was and is Desert Crest 
Development. Ms. Barker's deposition disclosed Magelsen was actually her 
husband, and that he was Desert Crest's managing agent, and the only agent 
of Desert Crest with knowledge of the facts. Magelsen attended Barker's 
deposition and while there stipulated to September 20, 2000 for his own 
deposition. Defendants and Magelsen then unilaterally delayed Magelsen's 
deposition, first to October 9, 2000, then to November 6, 2000. Magelsen 
refused to appear that date and has not stated when if ever he would make 
himself available. 
Defendants have thrown one stumbling block after another in the path 
of BMC's attempt to discover the facts. . . . Defendants have made a 
deliberate effort to frustrate the discovery process for the express purpose of 
impairing BMC's ability to prepare for trial. In light of Defendants' conduct, 
the Court is entirely within its discretion in ordering an appropriate sanction 
under Rule 37. 
[R315, incorporating by reference R296-298] 
Desert Crest and Barker did not challenge the evidentiary basis for the trial court's 
findings at the trial court level, and do not challenge BMC West's proffers of evidence 
now. The trial court accepted BMC West's proffers of Defendants' dilatory discovery 
tactics. By failing to object, Desert Crest and Barker waived any objections they may have 
had to the evidence. 
In Lefaviv. Bertoch. 2000 UT App 5, f IT, 999 P.2d 817, 821, this court stated: 
To successfully challenge the trial court's findings of fact on appeal, 
Bertoch and Poulson must "marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous." When an appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, "we refuse to consider the merits of die challenges to the findings 
and accept the findings as valid." 
Id. (citations omitted) Even if the Brief of Appellants challenged the trial court's findings 
(it does not), Desert Crest and Barker make no attempt to marshal the evidence. This court 
should ignore any such challenge, and affirm the trial court's findings. 
Failure to raise an argument before the trial court precludes a party from raising that 
argument on appeal. Sittner v. Schriever. 2000 UT 45. If 16. 2 P.3d. 442,444. Except 
for that part of the Order striking the Affidavit of Desert Crest Corporation, Desert Crest 
and Barker did not challenge the trial court's findings, conclusions or order regarding Rule 
37 sanctions, and do not challenge those findings or conclusions now. The trial court's 
findings and conclusions regarding Desert Crest's and Barker's willful and persistent 
dilatory discovery tactics [pages 17-19 supra] are undisputed on appeal. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY STRUCK THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
DESERT CREST. 
A. Defendants Did Not Preserve The Issue For Appeal, And Have Not 
Adequately Briefed The Issue. 
BMC West incorporates by reference its argument on pages 1-2 supra regarding 
"Issue I - Preservation of Issue." 
In Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 126, 8 P.3d 281, 288 
(citations omitted; emphasis in original), this court observed: 
"It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a 
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Moreover, the party must 
specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought "to a 'level of consciousness 
before the trial court.' " This requirement "serve[s] the interests of judicial 
?n 
economy and orderly procedure" by not only giving the trial court a chance 
to correct error, but by making the parties "crystallize issues prior to appeal." 
When issues are not brought to the trial court's attention in a timely manner, 
they are "deemed waived, precluding this court from considering their merits 
on appeal." 
Desert Crest and Barker argued to the trial court only that the Affidavit should 
remain on the ostensible (but erroneous, see Point 11(B) infra) grounds it "is based upon the 
knowledge of the corporation through its agent Jessica Barker." [R287] Desert Crest and 
Barker did not even mention, much less analyze, whether the trial court would abuse its 
discretion by striking the Affidavit as a Rule 37 sanction. [R284-290] Because Desert 
Crest and Barker did not bring the issue to the trial court's attention "in a manner sufficient 
to obtain a ruling thereon", under Holmstrom they waived the issue, precluding this court 
from considering it on appeal. 
Alternatively, Desert Crest and Barker have not adequately briefed the issue. In 
Coleman exrel Schefski vs. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \1', 17 P.3d 1122, 1124, the Court 
stated: 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that 
are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 
1988); accord State v. Herrera , 895 P.2d 359, 368 n. 5 (Utah 1955) 
(disregarding issues not properly briefed); Utah R. App. P. 24(j). Failure 
to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes inadequate briefing. See 
UtahR. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating that briefs must contain reasoned analysis 
based upon relevant legal authority); Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (declaring that 
an issue is inadequately briefed when the "overall analysis of the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court"). 
See also Smith nka Schermerhorn v. Smith. 1999 UT App 370, ^8-9, 995 P.2d 14, 16: 
o i 
Briefs that are not in compliance with Rule 24 may be disregarded or stricken 
sua sponte by the court. Briefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon 
relevant legal authority. . . . Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating 
the validity of her points on appeal. Rule 24 is a roadmap which, if 
followed, maximizes an appellant's chances for success. Our detailed 
discussion of Rule 24 is not a slavish devotion to form over substance. 
Rather, it is explained by our complete inability, given the deficiencies in 
briefing, to review the merits of the trial court's decision. 
Any "analysis" in Desert Crest's and Barker's brief is limited to an unsupported 
contention, without any citations to the record, or reviews of fact or law, that the trial court 
struck the December 13, 1999 Affidavit of Desert Crest solely "upon the notion that the 
Appellants were in violation of the October 7, 1999 order," and that "the information 
Appellants provided in their affidavit was also provided to Appellee in the form of answers 
to Appellee's first set of interrogatories." [R287-288] Defendants do not even indicate 
where their interrogatory responses could be found in the record, much less compare the 
responses to the Affidavits of Desert Crest or Rhodes. Desert Crest and Barker ignore the 
trial court's conclusions that Rule 37 sanctions were appropriate for Defendants' persistent 
dilatory discovery tactics [Point 11(C), infra]. They ignore mat the Affidavit was stricken 
on die independent grounds it was not based on the affiant's personal knowledge, and 
therefore offered in violation of Rule 56(c) [point 11(B), infra]. 
These omissions in Desert Crest's and Barker's trial memoranda and Brief of 
Appellants cannot be corrected at this late stage. "An appellate court "will not consider 
issues raised for the first time in the reply brief." Coleman, 19, 17 P.3d at 1124. 
Because Desert Crest and Barker did not make the argument to the trial court, and 
did not adequately brief this argument on appeal, instead shifting the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court, this court should decline to address the argument. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Struck The Affidavit of Desert Crest as Not 
Based on The Affiant's Personal Knowledge. 
The trial court struck the Affidavit of Desert Crest Development not only as a Rule 
37 sanction, but also because it violated Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). BMC West moved the 
trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c) to strike the Affidavit of Desert Crest Development as not 
made on personal knowledge. [R227, 232, 298]. The trial court found, and Defendants 
do not challenge on appeal, that 
When Ms. Barker finally gave her deposition, BMC discovered Ms. Barker's 
Affidavit of Desert Crest Development, offered to oppose BMC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, was not based on personal knowledge, and offered in 
blatant violation of Rule 56(c), which requires affidavits "shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. 
[R315, incorporating by reference R231] The trial court found, from comparing the 
Affidavit and Barker's deposition, that "when Ms. Barker finally gave her deposition, her 
testimony established the Affidavit of Desert Crest Development she gave to oppose 
summary judgment was not even based on her personal knowledge." [R315, incorporating 
by reference R293-295, 297] The Order then states, "For the reasons set forth in BMC 
West's supporting memoranda, incorporated here by reference as the Court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the Court grants BMC's motion ..." [R315] 
In GNS Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 P.2d 1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1994), this court 
stated: 
This rule [56(c)] provides that on a motion for summary judgment, 
"[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein." "[Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment," so an affidavit which does not meet the 
requirements of Rule 56(c) may be subject to a motion to strike. 
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added). The trial court struck the Affidavit of Desert 
Crest, not only as a Rule 37 sanction, but also because the Affidavit failed the test for 
admissibility under Rule 56(c). The trial court's decision is well grounded in fact and law, 
and is unchallenged by Defendants. Therefore, this court should affirm the trial court's 
decision striking the Affidavit of Desert Crest Development as not made on the affiant's 
personal knowledge. 
C. Defendants' Acts Are Sanctionable Under Rule 37. 
Desert Crest and Barker incompletely quote from Morton v. Continental Baking 
Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). Morton states: 
Before a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under Rule 37, the court 
must find on the part of the noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith, or 
fault, or "persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." 
Id. [citation omitted]. "To find that a party's behavior has been willful, there need only 
be 'any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance.' " Id. at 276. 
"M 
The trial court found both willfulness and persistent dilatory tactics by Desert Crest 
and Barker. It found "Defendants have thrown every available stumbling block in the path 
of BMCs attempt to discover the facts supporting Defendants' claims and bring this matter 
to judgment." [R315, incorporating by reference R230] The trial court found: 
Defendants have engaged in repeated delays and failures in responding 
to two sets of written discovery, repeated failures to appear for depositions, 
and in opposing summary judgment with an affidavit they knew was not made 
on personal knowledge in violation of Rule 56(c). Defendants have clearly 
demonstrated a disregard for the rules of court, and an intent to delay, hinder 
and obstruct BMC . . . [R315, incorporating by reference R232, 298] 
Defendants have thrown one stumbling block after another in the path 
of BMCs attempt to discover the facts. Defendants have made a deliberate 
effort to frustrate the discovery process for the express purpose of impairing 
BMCs ability to prepare for trial. In light of Defendants' conduct, the Court 
is entirely within its discretion in ordering an appropriate sanction under Rule 
37. [R315, incorporating by reference R297] 
The trial court's findings and conclusions are supported by the record. Desert Crest and 
Barker do not challenge those findings or conclusions. They fail to marshal any evidence 
to show the trial court's decision is a clear abuse of discretion. 
The trial court properly found Desert Crest and Barker culpable both for persistent 
dilatory discovery tactics frustrating the judicial process, and for willfulness (intentional 
failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance) with respect to their discovery 
tactics. Those findings have an evidentiary basis, and are not dependent on an erroneous 
conclusion of law. Morton at 274. The trial court was within its discretion in concluding 
Desert Crest's and Barker's conduct warranted an appropriate Rule 37 sanction. 
D. The Trial Court's Choice of Sanctions Was Within Its Discretion. 
As a Rule 37 sanction, the trial court ordered "defendants are not allowed to 
introduce matters in evidence in opposition to the November 30, 1999 Affidavit of Charles 
Rhodes, and orders stricken any such matters in the record." That sanction is expressly 
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(B) and (d), and is well within the trial court's discretion. 
In Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997), Mr. Morton sued 
to recover damages for injuries he suffered in an accident with a vehicle driven by 
Continental's employee. The day before trial, Morton disclosed his expert witness would 
give testimony different from that which Morton had previously disclosed. The court 
continued the trial so Continental could conduct discovery on Morton's new theories. 
Continental served interrogatories and requests for production of documents. When 
Morton failed to respond, Continental filed a motion to compel discovery, to which Morton 
also did not respond. The court ordered Morton to respond to the discovery within ten 
days. Three days after the deadline, Continental filed a proposed order of dismissal. That 
same day, Morton served his discovery responses. When the court signed Continental's 
order of dismissal, and denied Morton relief from the order, Morton appealed. 
The Court of Appeals agreed Morton's belated service of discovery responses 
justified Rule 37 sanctions, but concluded prior case law allowed dismissal only for conduct 
more egregious than Morton's, and reversed the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the dismissal: 
Even though dismissal of a non-complying party's action is one of the 
"most severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed," it is clear from 
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the language of Rule 37 that it is within a trial court's discretion to impose 
such a sanction. "Because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties 
and the discovery process, they are given broad discretion regarding the 
imposition of discovery sanctions." Thus we have long held that we will not 
interfere unless "abuse of that discretion is clearly shown," We will find that 
a trial court has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose 
only if there is either "an erroneous conclusion of law or ... no evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's ruling." 
Morton, 938 P.2d at 274. The court then found "ample evidence in this case to support the 
trial court's ruling." That "ample evidence" consisted of a single belated response to 
written discovery requests in the face of a motion to compel (and four trial continuances at 
Morton's request, not otherwise sanctionable under Rule 37). Id. at 275. The court 
stated, "We have never expressed any rule which delineates a specific level of behavior 
which must be met before rule 37 sanctions are warranted." and then observed: 
[We have affirmed a trial court's dismissal as a sanction for behavior clearly 
less egregious than that apparently required by the court of appeals. See, 
e.g., WW& WB, Gardner, 568 P.2d at 736-38 (affirming default judgment 
entered against defendant because defendant's answers to plaintiffs 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents were late, even 
though they were filed before hearing on summary judgment motion); Tucker 
Realto, 396 P.2d at 412, 16 Utah 2d at 99-101 (affirming default judgment 
where plaintiff responded to court order to compel production of documents 
by only producing one of many required documents); accord Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 Pled 584, 586-87 (Utah. Ct. App.1990) 
(affirming default judgment where plaintiffs failed to timely respond to 
interrogatories after court granted several continuances on plaintiffs' behalf, 
and plaintiffs had been "somewhat uneven in discharging their burden of 
prosecuting the case in a timely fashion"). 
Id. at 276. The Utah Supreme Court then affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Morton's 
action under Rule 37(b)92)(c). 
This court has since upheld dismissal as within a trial court's discretion as a sanction 
for failing to produce documents in the face of an order compelling discovery. See Hales 
v. Oldrovd. 2000 UT App 75, 118, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (emphasis added): 
Once this initial determination is made, the full range of options for sanctions 
under Rule 37 is available, and the trial court has broad discretion to select 
which sanction to apply in the circumstances. No finding of a "complete 
failure to comply with discovery is required. Indeed, dismissal as a discovery 
sanction has been upheld for late or incomplete discovery responses. 
This case presents conduct by Desert Crest and Barker more egregious, and a 
sanction less severe, than the conduct found in Morton and Hales, and cases cited therein. 
Where as in Morton it is within a trial court's discretion even to dismiss an action for 
serving interrogatory responses only three days past a court imposed deadline, it is also 
within the trial court's discretion to merely order certain evidence excluded as a sanction 
for Desert Crest's and Barker's willful and persistent dilatory discovery tactics. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. Defendants Did Not Preserve The Issue For Appeal, And Have Not 
Adequately Briefed The Issue. 
BMC West incorporates by reference its argument on pages 2-3 regarding "Issue II 
- Preservation of Issue," and Point 11(A), supra. 
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B. Summary Judgment Was Proper Where There Was No Dispute of 
Material Fact. 
Desert Crest and Barker argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
because their Answers to Interrogatories created issues of fact. However, the trial court, 
pursuant to BMC West's motion [R227, R232, 299], struck ah of Desert Crest and 
Barker's evidence, including interrogatory responses, so far as it contradicts the Affidavit 
of Charles Rhodes. [R315] Desert Crest and Barker do not appeal that part of the Order 
striking their Interrogatory responses. Because the trial court struck from the record all 
evidence in opposition to the Affidavit of Charles Rhodes, the facts contained in Rhodes' 
Affidavit are undisputed. 
In his Affidavit, Rhodes testified to the following: BMC entered into a contract with 
Desert Crest Development for the sale of building materials, evidenced by a "Confidential 
Credit Application and Terms Agreement" which provides a due date for payment on 
purchases, and imposes interest or late charges of 2% per month for past-due payments, 
and attorney fees in collecting past-due amounts. BMC then delivered and Desert Crest 
accepted delivery of conforming goods ordered by Desert Crest pursuant to the contract, 
for which Desert Crest failed to pay. The principal balance due on Desert Crest's account, 
after adjusting for all payments and credits, was at least $15,312.77, for which Desert Crest 
is indebted according to the terms of BMC West's invoices. 
By admitting BMC West's Requests for Admissions, Defendants admitted Barker's 
personal guaranty was executed by a person with actual and apparent authority to sign on 
Barker's behalf, making Barker personally liable on Desert Crest's debt. 
As a result of the trial court excluding evidence as a Rule 37 sanction, the facts 
establishing Desert Crest's and Barker's liability for breach of contract, and the amount of 
BMC West's damages, are undisputed. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 ("All material facts 
set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement"). Based on the undisputed facts, the trial 
court correctly ruled BMC West was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
B. Summary Judgment Was Proper Where Defendants Requested No Relief 
under Rule 56(f). 
Desert Crest and Barker argue that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment because discovery was not complete. Desert Crest and Barker did not raise that 
argument below, and thereby waived it, [Point III(A), infra] 
On its merits, that issue is governed by Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(f), which provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot or reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order 
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
Desert Crest and Barker did not move the trial court for a Rule 56(f) continuance. 
They did not present the required Rule 56(f) affidavit stating why they could not present 
facts in opposition to BMC West's Motion for Summary Judgment. They did not even 
mention the issue before the trial court. [R168-174, 284-290, record generally] 
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The uncompleted discovery to which Defendants refer was not their own, but was 
BMC West's deposition of Ben Magelsen, Desert Crest's managing agent. BMC West had 
tried to depose Magelsen, and would have completed that discovery but for Magelsen's 
repeated failures to appear. Meanwhile, Desert Crest has always had full access to 
whatever information Magelsen possesses, and could have obtained from Magelsen an 
affidavit with whatever facts he had to oppose BMC West's motion. Since Desert Crest 
and Barker did not invoke Rule 56(f) at the trial court level, and since a Rule 56(f) 
continuance would not have given Defendants additional information in any case, the trial 
court did not err in granting BMC West summary judgment. 
IV. BMC WEST IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
ON APPEAL. 
The trial court correctly found BMC West is entitled by contract to its attorney fees, 
including those incurred in collecting its judgment. Desert Crest and Barker do not 
challenge that part of the order (except as their general challenge to summary judgment). 
The court, in affirming the trial court, should include a finding that BMC West's attorney 
fees and costs on appeal are recoverable under the terms of the Order. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not commit reversible error in striking the Affidavit of Desert 
Crest for lack of personal knowledge and as part of a more encompassing Rule 37 sanction 
not appealed. As a result of BMC West's Requests for Admissions being admitted, and the 
trial court striking all evidence in opposition to the November 30,1999 Affidavit of Charles 
Rhodes, there remain no genuine issues of material fact, and BMC West is entitled to 
summary judgment. Based on those findings, this court should affirm the trial court's 
February 7,2001 Order Granting Motion to Strike Affidavit, to Declare Admitted Requests 
for Admissions, for Rule 37 Sanctions, and for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 day of August, 2001. 
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